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Abstract. The distinction between synthetic and human voice uses the
techniques of the current biometric voice recognition systems, which pre-
vent that a person’s voice, no matter if with good or bad intentions, can
be confused with someone else’s. Steganography gives the possibility to
hide in a file without a particular value (usually audio, video or image
files) a hidden message in such a way as to not rise suspicion to any ex-
ternal observer. This article suggests two methods, applicable in a VoIP
hypothetical scenario, which allow us to distinguish a synthetic speech
from a human voice, and to insert within the Comfort Noise a text mes-
sage generated in the pauses of a voice conversation. The first method
takes up the studies already carried out for the Modulation Features
related to the temporal analysis of the speech signals, while the second
one proposes a technique that derives from the Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum, which consists in distributing the signal energy to hide on a
wider band transmission.
Due to space limits, this paper is only an extended abstract. The full
version will contain further details on our research.
Keywords: synthetic detection, modulation, temporal feature, steganog-
raphy, information hiding, speech signal covert communication, data em-
bedding, spread spectrum, signal processing
1 Introduction
This paper was developed starting from the hypothesis that automatic systems
generate conversations using a synthetic voice, whose breaks, where a comfort
noise is usually inserted, contain text messages, to be sent to a specific recipient
through a VoIP phone call. The idea of the scenario is to use the artifice of
the synthetic voice as a tool to confuse a hypothetical observer, thus giving the
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possibility to transmit hidden messages from one point to another without the
risk of being caught. In this scenario there are two important phases: first, the
recognition of a synthetic voice from the human one, taking as object of analysis
a VoIP conversation intercepted and rebuilt; second, the introduction of the
steganographic method, which could be used in VoIp conversations, but in our
case it will be applied directly to audio files of conversations.
In [2] a biometric voice verification system was initially proposed. The devel-
opment of such systems implies very deep studies for safety purposes, to prevent
that false identities are exchanged for real ones [9, 13]. To prevent a false identity
to be mistaken for a real one, the current safety studies start with the discrim-
ination of a human voice from a synthetic one. This work uses techniques of
vocal signals and aims at illustrating two new algorithms (MelFCC and MagM)
able to recognize human voices. Our research was inspired by the apporoach in
[12], where techniques for voice verification/conversion were introduced. Usu-
ally, in these techniques the voice signal is not input to directly the system that
performs the processing of the voice, but it is first transformed into a more com-
pact and meaningful representation [12], that allows to obtain a set of properties
named ”features” [10], that use the well-know Mel scale[8], which approximates
the human auditory system response. The Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCCs) are coefficients that collectively make up the Mel-Frequency Cepstrum
(MFC), which are a short-term representation of power spectrum of a voice sig-
nal. A cepstrum is the result of taking the Inverse Fourier transform (IFT) of
the logarithm of the estimated spectrum of a signal and the power cepstrum
in particular finds applications in the analysis of human speech[1].The MFCCs
(Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients[1, 8]) are calculated for each single frame
without knowing the next frame (frame by frame), therefore, it is very difficult to
capture the correlations between frames, or the temporal characteristics. On the
other hand, the frame-based operation in the process of synthesizing voice can
introduce temporal artifacts [11]. In order to consider the subsequent frame de-
pendence and therefore capture temporal artifacts generated by synthetic voice,
modulation properties were used to develop another algorithm for extraction of
features, together with the implementation of an additional technique that is able
to discriminate the human voice from synthetic one, named Magnitude Modu-
lation. The modulation features, derived from the amplitude spectrum, carry a
long term temporal voice information and therefore, are able to detect temporal
artifacts due to the frame by frame processing in synthesizing voice signal [3,
4, 7]. The modulation features were used to capture the audio frame change in
order to recognize the synthesized voice. In our study, to carry out discrimina-
tion, were produced two identical versions (length and vocabulary used) by two
different voice conversations, one containing the human voice, the other with
a synthesized voice. Each conversation was divided into parts of equal length
and each of them has been subjected to the analysis of algorithms implemented.
Similar partitioning was performed on individual conversations after have been
transmitted through a VoIP phone call, whose client used G. 711 codec.
In many VoIP telephony services, a signal called Comfort Noise (CN) is intro-
duced into the conversation breaks. The presence of this signal allows partners
to have the feeling that the line remains on, even during long or above aver-
age breaks. This signal is typically generated directly to the terminals, but, at
the source side, you can insert a hidden signal that contains a text message M ,
which, as such, is recognized as a network communication activities and therefore
encoded as if it were a voice, tricking monitoring system, located downstream
from the recipient, mistaking for CN. Since the direct insertion of a text mes-
sage, appropriately converted to a digital signal within the CN, would produce a
peak clearly visible with a simple frequency signal analysis, this work proposes a
steganographic technique, known in signal-processing as Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS). The DSSS allows to distribute the same earlier information
(energy of the converted text message) on a wider transmission bandwidth, thus
eliminating the peak emerged from the frequency analysis of the background
noise. This process does not change the overall power of the signal, which must
be sufficiently higher than noise to allow reconstruction at the nodes, because
the decrease in average spectral power density (dBm/Hz) is compensated by the
enlargement of the bandwidth [5, 6].
2 Synthetic Voice Detection
Some methods to recognize the synthetic voice from the human voice work
at frame level, i.e. splitting the signal into segments and lead, in the first in-
stance, separate analysis on them. Some of these techniques are focused on the
study of the characteristics of the signal amplitude such as the MFCC (Mel
Frequency Cepstral Coefficient), others, such as the MGDCC (Modified Group
Delay Cepstral Coefficients), exploit some properties of the phase of the signal
(and, therefore, its group delay). Both MFCC and MGDCC do not allow to
derive correlations between different frames as well as the temporal character-
istics of the extracted features. MM methods (Magnitude Modulation) and PM
(Phase Modulation) are respectively based on previous MFCC and MGDCC,
but they introduce additional processing that make possible to engage the tem-
poral relations between different frames, projecting features in an analysis of
medium-long term. This work used exclusively structured analytic methods of
signal amplitude, i.e. the MFCC and MM.
2.1 MFCC (Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients)
To derive the MFCC coefficients of a given signal it is necessary to process it by
the analysis of Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT), assuming that the signal
is quasi-stationary within a short period (for example a 25 ms window).
The STFT of a signal voice x(n) is as follows:
X(ω) = |X(ω)|eiΦ(ω) = Xreal(ω) + iXimaginary(ω)
where |X(ω)| is the magnitude spectrum, Φ(ω) is the phase spectrum and i =√−1. We note that X(ω) has two parts: real part
Xreal(ω) =
√
(Xreal(ω))2 + (Ximaginary(ω))2
and imaginary part
Ximaginary(ω) = arctan(
Ximaginary(ω)
Xreal(ω)
)
The power spectrum is defined to be |X(ω)|2.
Before running the STFT, and then derive the MFCCs, we must preprocess
the speech signal and divide it into separate windows. The pre-processing consists
in:
1. The speech signal is divided into overlapping segments of equal size with
duration of 25 ms, called frames, with a percentage of overlap between con-
secutive frames of 50%.
2. Each frame is multiplied by a “window function,” in our case we used the
Hamming window function needed to mitigate the effect that would create,
in the subsequent extraction of features, if you used a finite-size segment,
thinning the edges which lie at the beginning and end of each frame and
avoiding ghostly artifacts.
After terminated the pre-processing, the Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
are obtained for each frame window using the following steps:
1. Apply the FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) to compute for each frame the
spectrum X(ω) of x(n).
2. Compute the power spectrum (|X(ω)|)2.
3. Process the Filter-Bank Energies (FBE) applying the Mel frequency filter-
bank to the power spectrum (|X(ω)|)2.
4. Apply the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) to access the scale of the FBE
and enable us so to calculate the MFCCs.
Features extraction from MFCC
1. The signal is decomposed into frames consisting of n points with m shift
points.
2. For each frame the above analysis described is conduct to obtain c Mel
coefficients.
3. From the c Mel coefficients, new coefficients are derived, defined by the two
following functions “delta” and “delta-delta”:
delta. Consider a vector x of K elements
x(0), x(1), . . . , x(K − 1)
The delta is the function δx,N defined as follows:
δx,N (k) =
x(k) k ∈ {−1, . . . , N} ∪ {K −N, . . . ,K}∑Ni=1 i(x(k+i)−x(k−i))
2
∑N
i=1
i2
k ∈ {N,N + 1, . . . ,K −N}
delta-delta. Once defined δx,N , the delta-delta is defined as follows:
δδx,N (k) =
 δx,N (x(k)) k ∈ {−1, . . . , N} ∪ {K −N, . . . ,K}∑Ni=1 i(δx,N (x(k+i))−δx,N (x(k−i)))
2
∑N
i=1
i2
k ∈ {N,N + 1, . . . ,K −N}
Notice that δδx,N (k) = δx,N (δx,N (k)). The coefficients computed through
delta and delta-delta are known as the “differential” and the “accelera-
tion” coefficients, respectively. Because the voice seems to contain dynamic
information that is distributed over time and because the MFCC feature vec-
tors only describe the power spectral envelope of a single frame, the delta
coefficients allow to calculate the trajectories of the MFCC coefficient over
time. The delta-delta coefficients are calculated in a similar way, but this
time starting from delta and not from the MFCC static coefficients.
4. For each frame is obtained a vector of length 3c.
If N is the number of frames where the signal has been split, connecting the N
vectors of length 3c, we get a super vector of length 3cN . The variance of this
super vector is the feature of the signal under test.
2.2 Magnitude Modulation (MM)
The modulation features, obtained from amplitude spectrum, contain informa-
tion on long-term temporal features of voice signal, and therefore are able to
detect temporal artifacts due to the frame by frame processing in synthesizing
voice signal. The modulation features were thus used to capture frame variations
for synthesized voice.
Features extraction from Magnitude Modulation (MM)
1. Divides the signal into frames, consisting of nFFT points with mFFT shift
samples.
2. Defines a “segment” consisting of n consecutive frames of the type described
in Section 1, with m frame shift. The value of n must be sufficiently large to
allow the capture of temporal information.
3. From the spectrum of each frame gets c coefficients of the filtered banks by
Mel scale (c Mel-scale filter-bank coefficients). It defines “path filter-bank”
the n points set of the same coefficient of Mel.
4. Applies a MVN (Unitary Mean Zero Variance) for each trajectory of filter-
bank to normalize the average and variance from zero to one.
5. For each normalized trajectory, calculates the power density spectrum, cal-
culated with a different number of FFT points (nS) (considering only the
positive frequencies and therefore consists of nS2 points).
6. For the current window, gets an array that consists of c rows and nS2 columns,
vector given by concatenating of the c rows and nS2 coefficients.
7. Due to the large size and to the high correlation of the spectral modulation,
derived from different trajectories of filter-bank, it is necessary to reduce the
size by applying a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method. For each
window, it is calculated the maximum PCA variance among the possible c
(the PCA is applied considering as variables the Mel’s coefficients and the
frames as observations).
At the end of the above described process, if K is the number of windows where
the signal has been devided, we get K variances. In this experimental work we
used as feature of the signal the average (arithmetic mean) of the K maximum
variances.
2.3 Experiments and results
The study covers the extraction of the features related to the conversation files
(syntetic and human), which were divided in 17 and 16 parts. The features to
extract are 33 for the audio signal with human voice and 33 for the audio signal
with synthetic voice. Each of the 2N files available (N = 33 human and N = 33
synthetic) were submitted to MelFCC (Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients) and
MagM (Modulation Magnitude) analysis. To evaluate the performance of the two
methods, the study adopts the EER (Error Equal Rate). The EER is the error
rate that results when the percentage of the human voice is incorrectly classified
as a synthetic one and it is equal to the percentage of synthetic voice incorrectly
classified as a human voice. The two parameters considered were the FAR (False
Acceptance Rate) and FRR (False Rejection Rate). The FAR, specifies how
often the system is tricked, i.e. when a synthetic voice gets wrongly perceived
as a human voice. The FRR, specifies the frequency with which the system fails
to indicate that a human voice is truly human. Lower is the EER value, better
will be the performance. In order to calculate the variance of the trajectories
produced by the models between the different signals (synthetic and human)
there was produced a simulation with the two methods of analysis proposed
(MelFCC and MagM).
Each point on the blue curve corresponds to a feature of one of the 33 parts of
2 human conversation files. Similarly, each point of the green curve is given from
the feature derived from the 33 parts of 2 synthetic conversation files. The curves
shown in Figure 1 are the result of an experimental standardization process,
whose steps will be described in detail. This work is based on the assumption
that events logging of digital files, can be characterized, from a statistical point
of view, in such a way that the features associated with human speech, as well
as those relating to synthesized conversations, are determinations of a variable
of a stationary and ergodic random process.
Fig. 1. MelFCC and MagM graphs curves
We consider three random variables: r, which is extracted from the R(t)
process, associated with the “real signal” Er, with expected value mr; variable
s, that is extracted from process S(t) concerning the event “synthetic signal” Es,
with expected value ms; variable x, extracted from the process X(t), associated
with the event “signal” Ex given by the union event “real signal” with the event
“synthetic signal” (Ex = Er∪Es). We adopt the following assumptions:
1. Variable r has N determinations in a R set of equally probable values.
2. Variable s has N determinations in a set S of equally probable values.
3. Variable x has 2N determinations in a set X of equally probable values
(as of R and S), where the first N determinations belong to set R and the
determinations by the (N + 1)-th to the 2N -th belong to set S.
4. Both R(t) and S(t) are stationary and ergodic (then X(t) is the same).
The expected value of the random variable x is
E(x) =
2N∑
i=1
1
2N
xi =
N∑
i=1
xi
2N
+
2N∑
i=N+1
xi
2N
=
mr
2
+
ms
2
= mx
that is given by the arithmetic mean of the two expected values mr and ms.
Thus, proceeding to a experimental normalization, as depicted in Figure 2,
if x is the vector of the 2N determinations of the random cumulative variable x,
taking away mx to each of 2N determinations (or features), it gets a new random
variable with expected value zero. In order to make it with single variance, simply
compute the variance of the new random variable (x−mx) and split each of the
new 2N for this determination. As shown in Figure 2, the straight line parallel to
x-axis through the origin is a little “watershed” between the features of human
signals and those of the synthetic conversations.
Symmetrical thresholds vectors have been considered in respect to the origin,
namely vectors th with Nt components, whose values belong to {−M,−M +
1, . . . ,M − 1,M}, attributing to the first cell th[0] the score 0% and to last cell
th[Nt − 1] the score 100%. The values used in the simulations were M = 3 and
Nt = 240. The false positive (False Acceptance) happens when a determination
(that is a feature of a synthetic signal) is greater than the threshold. Similarly
the false negative FR (False Rejection) happens when a value of r (in other
words, a feature of a real signal) is less than the threshold.
Fig. 2.
We denote by Fr the vector of false negative FRR (False Rejection Rate), with
Nt length, and by Fa the vector of false positives FAR (False Acceptance Rate).
For each threshold value th[i], Fr(th[i]) is the number of points on the curve of
real signals that are under the threshold, divided by N , while the Fa(th[i]) is the
number of points on the curve synthetic signals which are above the threshold,
divided by N . The Fr curve increases with the value of th[i], while Fa decreases.
There will be a th[j] threshold value for which Fr(th[j]) = Fr(th[j]) = EER
(Equal Error Rate).
Fig. 3. MelFCC and MagM EER graphs.
2.4 VoIP conversations analysis with MelFCC and MagM
algorithms
Also in this case the study proceeded by applying the algorithms MelFCC and
MagM to human voice files and to synthesized voice files, obtained through a
VoIP connection. The following figures report the obtained results and show
there is not a substantial difference in the operation of the algorithms we used.
EER curves for both algorithms demonstrate that it is possible to discriminate
a human voice from a synthetic one, even for VoIP conversations, confirming the
greater goodness (more value the EER) of MagM algorithm than the MelFCC.
In Table 1 we can observe EER values obtained from the simulations.
Fig. 4. MelFCC and MagM VoIP graphs curves.
Fig. 5. MelFCC and MagM EER VoIP graphs
3 Steganography: Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
In Figure 6 we have a representation, both in time and frequency domain, of a
50 ms duration Comfort Noise signal, sampled at 32 KHz and estimated spec-
trum of 4096 FFT points. Supposing to have a bits sequence, derived from a text
Fig. 6.
encoding, as a message M to be transmitted. Each character is encoded with nB
bits (for example 8 in ASCII). A message of a length of nC characters, will pro-
duce a nCnB bits length message to be transmitted. Consider for example these
possible initial 18 bits, obtained by encoding some text characters: 01111000,
11010111, and 11. Tb is the bit time. With reference to the sampling rate of 32
Table 1. EER Values
No-VoIP VoIP
MelFCC 0.1212 0.1515
MagM 0.0606 0.0758
kHz, it follows that a single bit corresponds to nsamplePerBit = Tbfs samples.
Setting the interval bit to 32 ms and having sampling rate like 32 kHz we get
a nsamplePerBit of 1024 samples. Therefore, the previous 18-bit sequence will be
used in a window of a 576 ms time and composed of 18432 samples. A signal of
this type will never be transmitted because its drastic changes in amplitude will
produce very large high frequency components, thus requiring a very large trans-
mission bandwidth. To avoid this issue, the signal can be filtered with a low-pass
filter with appropriate cut-off frequency (approximately 0.5Tb ) and translated in
audio band frequency, centered in a frequency carrier of fc =
fs
4 = 8 KHz.
We can now insert this signal inside the Comfort Noise, then a 3dB Signal
to Noise Ratio, the signal strength to be inserted will be about twice that of the
comfort noise. Looking at Figure 7, we can realize that in the domain of time
it is pretty hard to note an anomaly, but in the frequency domain we notice a
visible peak frequency.
Fig. 7.
In order to improve this method, and inspired by papers [5, 6], we introduce a
technique called Spread Spectrum, which allows to eliminate the peak that previ-
ously emerged of about 16 dB from the background noise. For example, Figure 8
shows two signals with associated power equal to about -44 dBm (40nW), but
having respectively (in blue), power physics average spectral density, of about
−71 dBm
Hz (
79.5 pW
Hz ), for a band of 500 Hz, and that wider (green) power physics
average spectral density of about −86 dBmHz (
2.5 pW
Hz ), for a 16 KHz band.
Fig. 8.
Figure 8 shows that if we decrease the power spectral density, we can get
results by widening the bandwidth, thus, if the signal carries a binary message,
also a considerable increase in throughput, i.e. reduction of bit time Tb. In order
to broaden the signal bandwidth, without increasing the bit transmission speed
(therefore decreasing Tb) we must multiply the signal, each bit time Tb, for
another signal, named Spreading, that for simplicity is always the same for each
bit interval (but in theory it could be used an algorithm to modify it) consisting
of a number Sf (Spreading factor) of bits not carrying any information, because
they are repeated periodically, each of which has a chip time durability Tc =
Tb/Sf . It follows that the number of samples for each interval (Tc) chips will be
a Sf -th for each bit interval (Tb). According to the general principle presented,
we decided to multiply the signal, each bit time Tb = 32 ms, for a Pseudo
Noise sequence of spreading, to ensure a more evenly distributed spectrum in
the existence band. Using a spreading sequences of this type, spectrum will be
as flat as possible. Selecting a spreading factor Sf = 256, the chip time of PN
sequence (which will multiply the signal bit time for bit time) will be Tc =
Tb
Sf
,
i.e. 32 · 10−3/256 = 125 µs.
Therefore we have again a difficult distinction in the time domain, but this
time the distinction will be difficult even in the frequency domain, since there
will no longer be the presence of a carrier wave with a peak spectral density
that emerges from the depths of about 16 dB. In Figure 9 we can observe a
comparison between the first and the second technique of steganography.
The last comparison locates the only critical point of the technique previously
presented. In the first technique we did a simple analysis of the signal density
spectrum to detect an anomaly, but the Spread Spectrum technique can be
noticed just by considering the signal power density spectrum to the second
power. Indeed, although it is difficult to see any trace of the modulated signal in
Fig. 9.
occult way, if we look at the spectrum in Figure 10, we can notice the presence
of a spectral density peak at f = fc = 8 KHz and two other equally spaced
peaks from fc.
Fig. 10.
3.1 Application and results
To implement the steganography algorithm, the 33 synthetic files were examined
to identify the files with long pauses. From the examination 3 files were chosen,
and then the study applied the steganography algorithm, getting the same results
for each one. The text message that was transmitted and subsequently recovered
was “Rome22May,” indicating a place and a day of the week, to simulate the
will of sending occult logistic and temporal informations.
1. Pre-processing phase
Used variables:
– Hiddentext = “Rome22May” 9 characters
– Number of samples for bit nSampleForBit = 136
– Frequency sampling fs = 22050 Hz
– Bit time Tb, nSampleForBit/fs = 0.0062 s
– Number of samples for chip nSampleForChip = 2
After identifying the time period containing the longest pause and inserted
the comfort noise signal within all pauses, the hiding message has been con-
verted to bits by using the 8 bit ASCII encoding, for a total of 9 characters
of 8 bits, namely 72 bits. The bit sequence derived from ASCII conversion
was used to generate the digital signal using BPSK modulation, rectangular
filter and oversampling factor equal to nsamplePerBit.
2. Spread Spectrum phase
Used variables:
– SpreadingFactor Sf ,
nSampleForBit
nSampleForChip
= 68
– Chip time Tc, Tb/Sf = 9.12 · 10−5
Once modulated, the spreading binary sequence must have good spectral
properties, looking like a white noise. For this reason we used the MATLAB
function randint, and BPSK modulation with oversampling factor of
nSamplePerBit
Sf
=
2. The generated spreading sequence was multiplied with the previously gen-
erated digital signal, for each bit time. In order to reduce the bandwidth oc-
cupation, a 256-th order minimum phase filter (FIR) was applied, low-pass
with fc2 = 2 cut-off frequency, where fc =
1
Tc
= 2, Tc = chip time equal
to TbSf . The spreading signal was filtered and used to modulate a carrier fre-
quency fp and summed to the comfort noise signal to be inserted into the
pause of the audio file selected (see Figure 11).
Fig. 11.
3. De-Spreading phase
The De-Spreading phase requires that the recipient is aware of the following
parameters:
– startSample and stopSample of the signal audio received.
– nSamplePerChip value and SpreadingFactor value.
– fp carrier frequency where the signal was modulated.
– Spreading/De-Spreading sequence, composed by Sf binary symbols.
From the audio signal received, containing the hidden text message, the por-
tion in question was extracted for the process of steganography, and restored
in the base-band. This is obtained by multiplying the signal by cos(2pifpt)
and applying a lowpass filter to remove the 2fp replication. The BPSK sig-
nal with a binary frequency equal to fc = fbSf , has been demodulated
exploiting the small oversampling factor equal to 2, to get a signal with
an antipodal levels signal 1, and −1. The reconstruction of the spreading
binary signal was obtained by applying the sign function (1 − sign())/2,
which passes from the antipodal levels 1 and −1 to the logic levels 0 and 1.
The bits sequence that we got, equal to 9792 bit (Nb × nSamplePerBit), was
organized in an array of Nb rows by nSamplePerBit columns. Each row cor-
responds to one bit of the ASCII encoded text message which has been
sent. To get the despreading bit sequence we carried a series of mathe-
matical operations, applying the XOR function, between the received bits
and the spreading bits sequence. The generic r line of the despreading ma-
trix, is given by XOR(c, s), where c is a binary string of nSamplePerBit bit,
all equals the ASCII encoding bits of the case, and s is the binary ver-
sion of spreading sequence. Because the receiver knows s, she will com-
pute XOR(XOR(c, s), s) = XOR(c,XOR(s, s)) = XOR(c, z) = c, where
z = 00 · · · 0.
After the despreading process, for each bit of the binary ASCII sequence
of the transmitted text, nSamplePerBit bits were obtained, which should be
all equal to each other and equal to the original text bits transmitted. In
the case that something was received incorrectly, the error can be recovered
as long as at least nSamplePerBit/2 + 1 are properly received. To recover the
72 bits of the ASCII encoding text transmitted we proceeded to conduct
a review with a majority decision for every 136-bit sequence ( 9792136 = 72),
which is equal to the value we used for nSamplePerBit.
The process of recovering the transmitted text was completed by applying
the function that transforms the binary sequence obtained into 8-bit ASCII
characters, from which was derived the information “Rome22May,” which
was been transmitted in covert mode.
4 Conclusions
This work showed the feasibility of the initial scenario assumptions, concerning
the transmission using steganography techniques of hidden messages through
VoIP calls and the use of a synthetic voice audio signals. In that regard, the Mel
Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MelFCC) algorithm and the Magnitude Mod-
ulation (MagM) algorithms have been developed, based on the analysis of the
voice detection techniques proposed in the literature, to discriminate a human
voice audio signal from a synthetic voice audio signal. The results showed that
these algorithms have basically the same behavior, whether applied to the orig-
inal file, synthetic or human, whether transmitted through a VoIP phone call.
The steganography algorithm proposed, based on the application of the tech-
nique called “Spread Spectrum,” has allowed us to confirm that we can hide a
text within the comfort noise introduced in the pauses (as normally happens in
a telephone call) of an audio file.
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